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Abstract—Any secure network is only as secure as its weakest
component. With overt channels tightly secured and attackers
have started focusing on optical, audible, magnetic, and thermal
covert channels to access sensitive systems. In this paper, we
present a novel, reliable and bidirectional optical covert channel
which uses optical mice. In this channel, the photocell in the
mouse is used as a receiver while the LED is used as a transmitter.
Our multiple experiments, which use mouse to mouse, mouse to
camera and torch to mouse, show that the transmission rate can
go as high as 10 bits per second. Additionally, we study the
effects of infrared, distance and brightness on mouse input. We
also show that infrared mice are susceptible to a similar kind of
attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, covert channels have been a topic of
interest to many researchers in different areas including the
academic and the industry. There are many factors that make
cover channels very attractive to attackers and cybercriminals
but the most important one is the fact that they hide the
existence of the communication. Recently, many network-
based covert channels have been proposed that uses different
network protocols in various ways to create a secret channel to
hide the information exchange process. Other covert channels
that have been proposed are the temperature-based covert
channels which transmit data by measuring the changes of
temperature different host devices. On the other hand, another
type of covert channels that have not been discovered in depth
and as common as the other types is the optical cover channels.
The reason this type is not widely considered is that they are
visible and can be seen by the human eye which makes it
easy to detect by others. Although, optical covert channels
provide a very good data transfer rate and high performance.
In contrast to the common covert channels that exfiltrate data
from a device via hardware implant or by manipulating the
characteristics of an internal electronic component, optical
covert channels use a visible light in a way that is almost
undetectable to the human eye.
In this paper, we propose an optical covert channel using
an optical mouse which uses a light source, usually LED, and
a light detector to detect movement relative to a surface. The
optical covert channel was tested in an Air-gap Lab where
all computers are physically isolating from any network and
from the Internet. Air-gap labs are considered very secure and
nothing can be transferred out of the lab.
A. Motivation
The reason we decided to use an optical mouse to create a
covert channel is that they are widely used and they replaced
the older mechanical mouse design, which uses moving parts
at the bottom of the mouse to sense motion. We have also seen
that attackers have quite a few novel methods at their disposal
to break air-gapped labs[1][2][3]. Most of these exploit devices
which can receive or send information and are not secured.
Since optical mice are not only commonly used in secure labs
but also have the ability to send and read information without
restriction, we decided to focus on it.
B. Contribution
There has been some research on exploiting security
vulnerabilities in mice in the past. These include wireless
mice, mousejack etc[4][5]. Additionally, it has been shown
that optical mice, with some modification, can be used to
scan items. However, there has been no work on using mice
as covert channels to exfiltrate or infiltrate information, and,
as far as our research has shown, we are the first to develop
this channel. We show it is possible to create a reliable,
bi-directional communication channel using an optical mouse
with transmission rates as high as 10 bits per second.
The entire set up requires - at least, in mouse-to-mouse
communication - no additional hardware and just needs a
small script to both receive and send data.
The rest of the sections in this paper are structured as follow.
In Section II we discuss the background of covert channels and
the optical ones specifically. Section III describes the covert
channel’s model and section IV states the proposed approach
design. Section V provides the implementation details and
evaluation. Section VI discusses some related work that have
been done. The last section, VII, concludes the paper with a
brief summary.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Brief history of covert channels
In 1973, Butler W. Lampson was the first to define covert
channels as the services that are not intended for information
transfer at all[6]. The definition of covert channels was later
modified by Richard A. Kemmerer in 1983 to be an entity that
can be used to transmit the malicious data secretly between
subjects [7]. Either way, all definitions agree that the term
covert channels is different from encrypted channels which
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focus on making the data indecipherable to others. Covert
channels, on the other hand, focus on hiding the existence
of the data transfer process and the channel itself.
One of the first forms of covert channels was stenography
which is basically a way of embedding a secret message
in an innocuous wrapper, to communicate privately in an
open channel [8]. However, stenography is still one form
of covert channels and there are more discovered by both
attackers and researchers. In fact, the field or the topic of
covert communications is very challenging and it opens new
directions for research especially in the detection and the
prevention sides. Covert channels are not only used by cyber-
criminals for malicious purposes but they are also used by
governments and industries for various uses and cases. In some
cases, they are also used to evade censorship.
B. An optical mouse from the inside
In this paper, we are presenting an optical covert channel
that uses an optical mouse in different experiments to send
and receive data. They differ from the laser mouse which uses
a laser to illuminate a surface while the optical mouse uses
light-emitting diode (LED). However, the main idea behind the
optical mouse is that it uses LED, which is mounted at the
bottom of the mouse, to shine a red light every time the mouse
changes from its initial position. Also, it turns ON with every
click of the buttons on the left or right. The light that the mouse
shines gets reflected back off the surface into a photocell
detector, which is also mounted at the bottom of the mouse
and next to the light emitter as illustrated in figure 1. The
photocell detects the reflected light as the analog movements
of the user’s hand and then it convert these movements into
digital signals in order to send them to the computer to perform
further actions. Specifically, it works like a tiny camera and
it takes about 1,500 pictures every second. However, the user
might make very small and precise movements that could be
hard for the photocell to detect. Therefore, the optical mouse
has a lens that is placed in front of the photocell which is used
to magnify the reflected light. This way, the computer will be
able to react faster and respond more precisely to the mouse
small movements.
On the other hand, inside the mouse, all the light detected
and the pictures taken by the photocell and the lens get
directed towards the CMOS (Complementary Metal Oxide
Semiconductor). The CMOS will then send all the images
it received to the digital signal processor (DSP). The main
purpose of the DSP, which is called the optical navigation
engine, computes all the changes between the collected images
that it received. It also observes the patterns in the collected
images and it sees how the patterns have moved since the
previous image. The optical navigation engine can determine
the mouse movement and how far it has moved according to
the change in patterns over a sequence of images. Eventually,
the mouse can then send the corresponding coordinates to the
computer.
Figure 1: Air-gapped Optical Mouse Components
C. Air-Gap labs principals and covert channels
One of the great features of the covert channels that we are
proposing in this work is that it can be built and operated in an
air-gapped lab. This term has been used a lot in recent years to
secure certain infrastructures where extra security is required.
The main policy in an air-gapped lab is that all computers
must be physically isolated from any network and any system
that is connected to any other network specifically the Internet.
Also, there should be no PC or network equipment that has
any access to outside networks. And, the reason for that is
to protect the system and the infrastructure from inadvertent
attack traffic that is generated by adversaries. Another air-gap
policy is that no devices, such as USB flash drive, can be
connected to any computer or any machine in the lab. Nothing
in the machines can be extracted to the outside and nothing
from the outside can be inserted in the machines in order to
achieve the goals of the air-gapped environments.
One of the main reasons for implementing such concept
is that most of the time it’s impossible for computers to be
hacked remotely if they are in an air-gapped environment.
However, there are different researches and efforts that have
been dedicated to creating covert channels that can be used
to send information in and out air-gapped computers. Table 1
summarizes some of the most common covert channels that
have been presented by different authors.
The covert channels mentioned in the table are all presented
by the same group of researchers from Ben-Gurion University
of the Negev. They created a thermal, electromagnetic, and
optical covert channels that can exfiltrate data from air-gapped
labs. The thermal approach that they presented was BitWhisper
which is a method of bridging the air-gap between adjacent
compromised computers by using their heat emissions and
built-in thermal sensors [9]. There are a couple of features
in their covert channel such that it supports bidirectional
communication and it doesn’t require the use of any additional
peripheral hardware. On the other hand, the electromagnetic
approach that the authors presented requires the use of USB
connectors implanted with RF transmitters to exfiltrate data
from a computer. The main downside of this methodology is
that it requires a hardware modification of the USB plug or
Covert channel Type Technology used
BitWhisper [9] Thermal built-in thermal sensors
VisiSploit [10] Optical computer LCD display
USBee [11] Electromagnetic RF transmitter
xLED [12] Optical Switch and Router LEDs
Table I: Convert channels in air-gapped labs
device, in which a dedicated RF transmitter is embedded.
Another approach is VisiSploit which uses a standard
computer LCD display in order to leak data. They get the
advantage of the low contrast or fast flickering images because
they are invisible to human subjects. Then, they recover
these images from photos taken by a camera. The authors
demonstrated that a malicious code that can be found on a
compromised computer can obtain sensitive information and
project it onto a computer LCD screen. They specified that
this process is invisible to users which allows adversaries
to reconstruct the data using a photo taken by a hidden
camera[10].
The other optical covert channel that they presented is
xLED were they covertly leaked sensitive data from air-gapped
networks via the row of status LEDs on networking equipment
such as LAN switches and routers. They demonstrated that
data can be encoded over the blinking of the LEDs and
received by remote cameras and optical sensors. The trans-
mission rate is 1 bit/sec to more than 2000 bit/sec per LED.
Compared with the previous covert channels presented
above, our approach doesn’t require any modification in the
air-gapped computer thus not breaking the rule of the air-
gapped lab to not modify existing configurations and settings
of any machine. Also, the covert channel that we’re presenting
can be functional in both directions as every mouse can be a
sender and a receiver. However, even though we are using a
laser and a flashlight, we are not connecting any device to the
computer like the USB. Therefore, we are also not breaking
another rule in the air-gapped lab which is not connecting any
device or peripheral to any machine.
III. OUR APPROACH DESIGN
In this section, we will talk about the approach we took to
establish a covert communication channel using optical mice
as either a transmitter, a receiver or both.
The sending machine is used to send encoded signals to a
mouse which transmits it by blinking. The receiving machine
is used to read mouse movement caused by shining light on
the photocell to decode incoming information. Whenever a
signal is read, the mouse is used to send an acknowledgment
signal (turn on and off twice) which ensures that the channel
is reliable. To start reading information, a predetermined
form of signal is sent to establish a connection. Another
predetermined form of signal is then used to close the
connection. A bi-directional channel can be created when a
mouse is used to both read and send information.
A practical scenario using this method could be using
mice to exchange data between two machines. The attacker
places two mice close to each other such that the underside
of the two face each other. The transmission program on the
computer can then be passed a file or a command which
is converted into binary and transmitted in the form of led
signals. The receiver machine will have the receiving program
which will convert the input into readable data. As can be
deduced, the most critical parts are to turn the mouse led on
and off and read mouse movement programmatically.
Send Information
This requires getting mouse id and then running operating
system specific commands to turn it off and on.
Linux
We first try to find all connected devices files with the
following command:
ls /sys/bus/usb/devices/*/product
These files are then opened and the content is read to
find all mice devices. We then return the device id which is
used to turn the mouse on and off:
ON : echo device id — sudo tee /sys/bus/usb/drivers/usb/bind
OFF : echo device id — sudo tee /sys/bus/usb/drivers/us-
b/unbind
Windows
For the Windows machine, similar steps are followed,
albeit with different commands. For instance, to get mouse id
we use the following command:
Get-PnpDevice — Select-Object -Property Friendly-
Name,InstanceId — out-string -Width 560
The results are then read and parsed, and the id of the
attached mouse is returned.
The turning off and on commands are also different:
ON: Disable-PnpDevice -InstanceId device id-Confirm:$false
OFF: Enable-PnpDevice -InstanceId device id -
Confirm:$false
Read Information
As explained in the previous sections, optical mice use their
photocells to detect a change in light which is then translated
into cursor movement. We use this cursor movement to read
information sent through the light signals.
Any movement is considered a 1, while no movement is
read as a 0. The commands for reading the data are, however,
different for Windows and Linux.
Linux
In Linux, data for input devices like mouse, keyboard or
controllers can be read from the directory /dev/input
We read mouse data by reading the file which registers mouse
Figure 2: Attack Model
movements:
cat /dev/input/mice
This is then decoded and transformed into information.
Windows
To read raw mouse input data, we can use Windows’ Raw
Input API[13]. For our project, we are using the library
MouseMeat which uses the same API to return the movement.
The communication channel we propose is based on this
aforementioned methodology to read and send information.
To transmit information effectively, we incorporate these
methods into our main program (mouse.py) which is imported
in both receiver (receiver.py) and sender (sender.py) code files.
Mouse.py
Mouse.py can be used to get a handle to an attached
optical mouse and can transmit or read information. It
contains Mouse class which provides helper functions like:
turn off
Turns off the mouse
turn on
Turns on the mouse
establish connection
If connection signal is read, starts reading information
send acknowledgement
Sends acknowledgement on receiving information by blinking
in predetermined order
close connection
If idle for x second, closes connection and ignores new
information unless connection established.
When instantiated the class looks at the operating system
and finds optical mice attached to the machine. If there
are multiple mice it picks the first one unless a pattern is
provided. The code behaves similarly on Windows and Linux
systems, with the only difference being the lower transmission
rate in Windows caused by the extra time it takes to turn off
the device.
Sender.py
This code is run on the sending machine and is used encode
the data into the binary form, send an establish connection,
send information and, lastly, fire a close connection signal.
Receiver.py
This code is run on the receiving machine. It reads mouse
movement, sends an ACK signal on successfully reading it,
and decodes the information. While the last two functions
are performed using the Mouse class, a native method is
used for reading mouse movement. The goal here is to read
/dev/input/mice which is difficult to directly. This is because
when the mouse is turned off no content is written and the
loop waits till it can read something. This means we can’t
generate data on mouse movement across time. To circumvent
this, we first run a script write_movemement.py which
reads /dev/input/mice contents continuously and writes them
to mouse_data.txt file. This file is then polled every
0.1 seconds to read any mouse movement. If there is any
movement, we convert it to a 1, otherwise, it’s 0. We then
Algorithm 1 Section of Mouse Class — Gives control of
mouse operations
c l a s s Mouse ( ) :
””” Mouse c o n t r o l l e r c l a s s
Swi tch on , s w i t c h o f f , pre−d e t e r m i n e d s i g n a l s
”””
mouse id = None
c o n n e c t i o n e s t a b l i s h e d = F a l s e
c o n n e c t i o n t i m e = None
d e f i n i t ( s e l f ) :
”””
Get i n s t a n c e i d
”””
s e l f . f i l e o b j = open ( s e l f . f i l e p a t h , ” rb ” )
d e v i c e a r r a y = s e l f . l s command response ( ” l s
/ s y s / bus / usb / d e v i c e s / ∗ / p r o d u c t ” )
f o r d e v i c e i n d e v i c e a r r a y :
w i th open ( dev ice , ’ r ’ ) a s d a t a :
i n f o = d a t a . r e a d ( ) . s t r i p ( )
i f ” mouse ” i n i n f o . lower ( ) :
device name = d e v i c e
b r e a k
. . . . .
Algorithm 2 Sending Information Linux 1— Switching
Mouse Off
d e v i c e a r g s = [ ’ echo ’ , d e v i c e i d ]
u n b i n d a r g s = [ ’ sudo ’ , ’ t e e ’ , ’ / s y s / bus / usb / d r i v e r s /
usb / unb ind ’ ]
e c h o d e v i c e = s u b p r o c e s s . Popen ( d e v i c e a r g s , s t d o u t =
s u b p r o c e s s . PIPE , s h e l l = F a l s e )
p roces s wc = s u b p r o c e s s . Popen ( u n b i n d a r g s , s t d i n =
e c h o d e v i c e . s t d o u t , s t d o u t = s u b p r o c e s s . PIPE , s h e l l
= F a l s e )
Algorithm 3 Sending Information Linux 2— Switching
Mouse On
d e v i c e a r g s = [ ’ echo ’ , d e v i c e i d ] # echo ’1−2’
b i n d a r g s = [ ’ sudo ’ , ’ t e e ’ , ’ / s y s / bus / usb / d r i v e r s /
usb / b ind ’ ] # sudo t e e / s y s / e t c
e c h o d e v i c e = s u b p r o c e s s . Popen ( d e v i c e a r g s , s t d o u t =
s u b p r o c e s s . PIPE , s h e l l = F a l s e )
p roces s wc = s u b p r o c e s s . Popen ( b i n d a r g s , s t d i n =
e c h o d e v i c e . s t d o u t , s t d o u t = s u b p r o c e s s . PIPE , s h e l l
= F a l s e )
average our signal using our pre-determined bit rate. For
instance if 1 bit is supposed to be transferred in 1 second,
we average last ten readings. This gives us reasonably good
accuracy.
Using the approach and python program discussed in
this section, we performed multiple experiments, all of which
were based on certain assumptions.
Algorithm 4 Reading Information Linux 1— Reading Input
f i l e = open ( ” / dev / i n p u t / mice ” , ” rb ” ) ;
t o a p p e n d t o = ” mouse da ta . t x t ”
t r y :
w h i l e True :
buf = f i l e . r e a d ( 3 ) ;
p r i n t ( buf )
w i th open ( to ap pe nd to , ’ a ’ ) a s f :
f . w r i t e ( buf )
e x c e p t K e y b o a r d I n t e r r u p t :
w i th open ( to ap pe nd to , ’w’ ) a s f :
f . w r i t e ( ’ ’ )
Algorithm 5 Reading Information Linux 2— Polling
mouse data.txt
d e f get movement ( s e l f ) :
”””
Get movement
”””
s e l f . f i l e o b j = open ( s e l f . f i l e p a t h , ” rb ” )
s e l f . f i l e o b j . s eek ( 0 , 2 )
w h i l e True :
t ime . s l e e p ( s e l f . s i g n a l r e a d w a i t )
l i n e = s e l f . f i l e o b j . r e a d l i n e ( )
i f n o t l i n e :
l i n e = ” ”
y i e l d l e n ( l i n e )
A. Assumption
For this covert channel to be viable, we make following
assumptions:
1. Both target and source machines are compromised.
2. Attacker is physically present at the location.
3. Optical mice are in use.
4. Mouse is not in use for any other activity while the
information is being transmitted.
In the following sections, we will discuss different experi-
ments performed to test the viability of the channel.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we will talk about differ experiments
constructed to study different attributes of an optical mouse
based channel. The experiments were:
Figure 3: Experiment 1 :Mouse to Mouse Set Up
Figure 4: Experiment 1: Decoded Information 10011011
1. Mouse to Mouse
2. Torch to Mouse
3. Mouse to Camera
A. Mouse to Mouse
In this set up, we put two mice together with their
undersides facing each other. Here one mouse acts as a
primary sender and the other one acts as a receiver. One
machine encodes, sends connection signal, sends information
after the connection is established, and then closes the
connection. The mouse connected blinks on to the photocell
of the second mouse which reads the information. The
movement is then read by receiver.py on the second machine
and decoded.
Results
For this experiment, the transmission rate ranged from
0.5 bits/sec (Linux) to 0.25 bits/sec (Windows) while the
transmission distance was 0. While this set up can work
in an airgap lab, the challenge is balancing the mice and
putting them close to each other. However, the ACK and
connection established signals mean that the user knows
when the connection and transmission is successful.
Figure 5: Experiment 2 : Torch to Mouse Set Up
Figure 6: Experiment 2 : Decoded Information
B. Torch To Mouse
In this experiment, we used a torch to send information to
a receiving mouse. The torch used blinked at a fixed rate and
was shone on the underside of the mouse. Initially, it was
quite a challenge to point the torch right on the photocell so
that it could be detected. However, using a torch with a larger
surface area and placing it near the exposed underside of the
mouse was enough for it to be detected. The method is the
same, first, a connection signal is sent and after the connection
is established, we start transmitting the information.
Results
We noticed that the mouse was able to read the information
at a transmission rate of around 10 bits per second. This
can go even higher as the mouse is able to detect incoming
signal every .01 second. However, the flickering rate of the
torch used in this experiment could not be increased so we
were able to achieve a maximum transmission rate of 10
bits/second. The transmission distance depends on how bright
the source is and for a 5V torch is limited to 20-30 cms.
Infrared Torch to Mouse
Some of our other tests confirmed that mouse can also
Figure 7: Experiment 3 : Extracted Frame after red masking
detect infrared which will not be detected by human beings.
Replacing the visible light torch with an infrared one should
give us similar results.
C. Mouse To Camera
In this experiment, we used a mouse as a transmitter
and camera as a receiver. Sender.py was used to
transmit information, and a camera was used to record
the mouse flickering. This video was then sent to
mouse video decoder.py file which generated 5 frames
every second, and used them to read the information being
sent. Since the maximum transmission rate out of a mouse is
1 bit every 2 seconds, this framerate was high enough to get
all the important frames. We used OpenCV to both extract
frames and apply a red mask over it to differentiate on signal
from off. We also observed that using HSV colors gave us
even better results[14]. Our assumptions were that only the
mouse was present in the picture and there was no other red
source of light in the frame.
Results
Our results showed that transmission was successful and the
transmission rate was .5 bits/sec (on Linux). The distance,
however, can be increased to more than 10-15 meters if other
assumptions hold.
V. RESULTS
Our experiments showed that mouse light can be success-
fully used to transmit information covertly. We were able to
show that it worked on both Windows and Linux operating
system, with a transmission rate of .25 bit/second. This trans-
mission rate increases to .5 bit/second under certain conditions.
In experiments in which mice were used as receivers, the trans-
mission rate was dependent on transmitters (laser, flashlight
etc). However, the error rate increased at the same time and
for information transmission to remain viable we can go only
as high as 1 bit per second. We also noticed that mice were
very sensitive to light changes and believe that modifying the
decoding code should allow us to increase the transmission
rate greatly.
VI. FUTURE WORK
Another research question, we plan to work on in the future
is looking at infrared and transmitting information using it.
This will allow us to work around our biggest limitation which
is the shining of LED. The switching on and off of the mouse
attracts attention, and infrared would be able to avoid that.
Another additional idea we would like to look at would be
changing the brightness level of the mouse instead of turning it
on and off. This, however, requires more fine-grained control
of the mouse and might be limited to certain mice models.
Lastly, we noticed in experiment 2 that our inability to
increase light flickering rate was a limitation. We plan on
working on a programmable device which can have different
flickering rates. We could also set up a light dependent resistor
or an integrated camera to read mouse acknowledgment signal.
This coupled with shining infrared light instead of visible light
would give us a small device which can be placed near a
mouse with its underside facing sideways and send and retrieve
information without being detected. Our method would be
similar to [15] in that we would be using an external device
to start information exchange.
VII. LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES
As in most optical cover channels, the major limitation in
all of the experiments that we developed was that the light
is visible in a way that makes it easy to detect if we didn’t
use other things to hide the covert channel. The flipped of
the up side down position of the mouse could be something
very noticeable and may raise the alarm flag. Also, the two
mice facing each other at the side that has the LED is another
noticeable thing although people might not think of it as a
suspicious problem. As a matter of fact, this was one of the
biggest challenges where we needed to balance the two mice
in a way where the LED of the first mouse face the photocell
detector of the other mouse and the same for the other one.
The balancing was very critical because of the curved top of
the mouse.
Another limitation is that the machines that the mice are
connected to have to be infected with our script. The fact that
we can’t inject a USB driver into an air-gapped computer and
not having an Internet connectivity make it harder as we will
need to type the code manually. Even though the current script
that we are using is not too long, it is still an issue because
any possible future improvement might make the script longer
which is a time consuming process.
In addition to all of the above, another limitation that we
found in our experiments is regarding turning the mouse on
and off. In Windows, it takes a long time to turn off. It takes
at least 2 seconds for the mouse to be off which was not the
case in Linux. This fact does affect the performance of the
covert channel but the effect is not as bad as we thought it
would be.
VIII. DETECTION AND PREVENTION
There are some methods that can be used to detect and
prevent attackers from using an optical mouse to create a
covert channel. The first thing we should focus on is the file
that the mouse is assigned to which logs events from that
specific mouse. This file can be used by the attacker to detect
when the mouse is moved and then he/she can decode the
input to read transmitted information. The access to this file,
as well as any other file that is associated with the mouse,
should be restricted to authorized people only.
Another solution that might not be really practical in most
cases but very effective is using a trackball mouse instead
of the optical one. This solution should be preferable in the
machines that stores high value or sensitive data that needs to
be very protected. However, it’s definitely the best way that
guarantees the prevention of any cover channel that utilizes an
optical mouse.
Likewise, mouse manufacturing companies can also add
additional security features to their drivers or the circuit. For
instance, photocells should not be able to detect infrared.
IX. RELATED WORK
There are lots of research papers regarding covert channels
and how to design and use them to leak out data from an air-
gapped computer in a lab. Different types of covert channels
have be developed such as electromagnetic, acoustic, thermal,
or an optical which is the least common type because it is
the one that is most likely to be detected. So, there isn’t
much work about optical covert channels but a very interesting
one is VisiSploit which exploits the limitations of human
visual perception in order to unobtrusively leak data through a
standard computer LCD display. The various experiments that
they did revealed that a very low contrast or fast flickering
images that are not visible to the human eye can be recovered
from photos that are taken by a camera. After that, they proved
that a malicious code on a compromised computer can obtain
sensitive data such as user names and passwords, and project
it onto a computer LCD screen, invisible and unbeknownst
to users, allowing an attacker to reconstruct the data using a
photo taken by a nearby (possibly hidden) camera[11].
Another interesting optical covert channel was designed
by Cyber-Security researcher Mordechai Guri who used a
malware to control a hard drive though it’s LED indicator
which blinks anytime a program accesses the hard drive, even
when a computer is asleep. He believes that any malware that
gets an access as any normal user would be able to manipulate
the hard drive LED without the need for an administrative
access. He found that the small hard drive indicator LED can
be controlled at up to 6,000 blinks per second. He and his
team were able to transmit data in a very fast way at a very
long distance[16].
On the other hand, we did not find any research that
discusses using optical mouse or any kind of mice to create a
covert channel and exfiltrate data out of an air-gap lab. Most
of the work done on this area was about using LED displays
and hard drive LED.
X. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This work shows how secure labs and other critical setups
are vulnerable to attacks which can be carried out over a novel
optical covert channel that uses mouse LED and photocell.
It also shows that using a different set up the transmission
rates can go as high as 10 bits per second at a distance of 30
cm. In some cases, when the mouse is used as a transmitter,
the transmission distance can be around 10 meters. The
channel provides reliability by sending acknowledgment
signals and is bi-directional which increases its viability
drastically. Additionally, it is proposed that by using infrared
light, this covert channel can evade human detection with
considerable ease. Since mice are commonly available
devices and are found in most of the secure labs, this covert
channel provides a large attack space. This summary and
other experiments lead the authors to conclude multiple things:
First, as other computer devices become more secure and a
focus of security researches, attackers might be more attracted
to exploiting new channels like the one this paper proposes.
Second, the transmission rate is high enough and with
certain modifications can go as high as 100 bits allowing
transmission of large data files.
Third, the computer mouse has been overlooked as a possi-
ble point of entry or exit for malicious or sensitive data. It can
be further secured by restricting its scope to only the tasks it
is required to do.
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